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I HAVE been asked to analyze the de-velopment of the new quest of the his-torical Jesus since 1959, to bring up to
date the presentation in my book, A New
Quest of the Historical Jesus.1 Since at the
time of the second impression of that book
in 1961 it was not possible even to include
the additional material found in the German
edition of I960,2 such an up-dating of the
material is highly necessary. The quantity
of literature which has appeared since 1959
exceeds considerably what had appeared
prior to that date. And, although much of
this added material has been repetitious and
has hardly advanced the debate, some sig-
nificant developments have taken place.
They have their focus in the emergence of
an opposition which had hardly become vis-
ible by 1959.
I
In spite of various inadequacies in my
publication of 1959, it has served its major
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purpose of calling forth an American discus-
sion of a new trend in German theology at
a time when the German discussion was still
in a formative stage, and with the result that
the discussion could become a two-way af-
fair. The very fact that the National Associ-
ation of Biblical Instructors is presenting a
symposium on this topic in 1961, only seven
years after the publication of Ernst Kase-
mann's programmatic essay,8 whereas the
NABI symposium on demythologizing in
1957 came sixteen years after Rudolf Bult-
mann's proposal of 1941, is symptomatic of
the increasing synchronization of the two the-
ological traditions which should be an attain-
able objective in our day.4 A series of sym-
posia to be published by Harper & Brothers
under the title. New Frontiers in Theology:
Discussions Among German and American
TJieologians, is to appear beginning in 1963
with volumes entitled The Later Heidegger
and Theology and The New Hermeneutics.6
We may express the hope that future NABI
symposia will help this series achieve its
purpose.
The extent to which the new quest of the
historical Jesus has become a two-way con-
versation is indicated by the fact that Rudolf
Bultmann's reply to his students before the
Heidelberg Academy of Sciences6 not only
included critiques of my book and of his
German students, but also was able to ap-
peal for support to letters from Edwin M.
Good of Stanford University and Van A.
Harvey of Southern Methodist University,
and to a review by R. H. Fuller of Seabury-
Western Theological Seminary. Accord-
ingly, one of the significant new aspects of
the discussion with which we can appropri-
ately begin is the American participation
and the particular role it plays.
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Since the original quest of the historical
Jesus never really ended in America, we
sense very acutely that the basic Problematik
of the new quest is whether it can be any-
thing other than a revival of the old quest
with all its weaknesses, i.e., whether it can
be genuinely post-Bultmannian in retaining
Bultmann's valid criticisms of the old quest.
To be sure, the very persistence of the orig-
inal quest at the grass roots means that the
new one can count on a grass-roots recep-
tivity. Indeed, one may expect a blurring of
the distinction between the original quest
and the new one—a setback I sought to
avoid by devoting the first half of my book
to a presentation of Bultmann's valid argu-
ment that the original quest was historically
impossible and theologically illegitimate. Of
course, it is also possible that one will
change with the changing times. Thus, Er-
nest Cadman Colwell, speaking before this
Association in 1959 on prospects for New
Testament scholarship during the next fifty
years, was able to refer to the new quest as
typical of the research of the future, not
simply because he as a student of Shirley
Jackson Case was convinced that Christian-
ity must build upon the historical Jesus, but
also because he believed that the socio-his-
torical method of Case must be replaced or
at least supplemented by the new methods
he had found exemplified in Powicke and
Bloch and which are usually associated with
the names of Dilthey and Collingwood.7
The Problematik involved in this un-
broken continuity with the original quest,
which is for better or worse the American
Sits im Leben of the new quest, becomes
quite visible in a very recent American life
of Jesus, Morton Scott Enslin's The Prophet
jrom Nazareth.8 In this volume, Form-criti-
cism and its kerygmatic theology are brushed
aside with the standard caricature: "In
place of the historical Jesus, whom they as-
sume it is impossible to discover, and thus
for whom further search is an unwarranted
waste of time, they set the figure of the
Eternal Christ and his part in the all-central
epic of salvation—the technical term is
Heilsgeschichte—which comprise the one
and only important chapter of all cosmic his-
tory."9 By thus presenting Form-criticism
as maintaining the obviously absurd position
that we can know nothing of Jesus, the orig-
inal questers seek to eliminate their critics
and to continue their quest as if nothing had
happened. It is no surprise that in such a
situation a young and vigorous Bultmannian
systematician, Schubert M. Ogden, should
take a first look at the new quest and com-
plain, "But it still remains a fair question
whether the extent of the alleged 'newness'
may not depend entirely too much upon see-
ing it against the background of a highly
over-simplified and even false impression of
Bultmann's own position."10 When Ogden
then comments in a footnote that "this ques-
tion is even raised, though no doubt unin-
tentionally, by Robinson himself," I would
merely respond that I quite intentionally
questioned the caricature of Bultmann's po-
sition and even went to the trouble of col-
lecting a long footnote of quotations from
Bultmann to disprove the caricature. How-
ever, in spite of all that we can do, the cari-
cature persists as a foil for the continuing
quest of the "compelling personality" and
"unflinching bravery" of Jesus.11
It is as just one more instance of this
well-known tradition that the talk of a new
quest of the historical Jesus strikes many
ears. The younger generation, for whom
that well-known tradition is anathema, are
therefore tempted to react to the new quest
by rejecting it out of hand. Paul W. Meyer
puts the matter bluntly: "In form, this [new
quest] parallels perfectly the older liberal
understanding of faith as the reproduction,
in my religious experience, of Jesus' feeling
of Sonship in relation to God—and it is like
the other totally dependent on historical fa-
miliarity with Jesus' person. We seem to
have here a complete capitulation to the
heirs of Schweitzer."12 And, significantly
enough, Meyer alludes to Walter Bell Den-
ny's The Career and Significance of Jesus
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(1934) as "an extreme example"—as if to
say, bad company corrupts good manners.
Hence, if any advocate of the new quest is
to make his point in the present situation,
he must go to great pains to argue that the
new quest does not "parallel perfectly" the
old. The new quest does not attempt to dis-
cover how Jesus felt, for the records tell us
not how he felt but what his significance
was. Jesus' understanding of existence was
not his stream of consciousness, but the un-
derstanding of existence which emerged in
history from his words and deeds. It is this,
not his personality or the alleged specifics
of his biography, which is his historic per-
son. Neither is faith to be regarded as the
imitating reproduction of a human stance.
Faith is a response to God, to the same es-
chatological act of God which the kerygma
proclaims as one with the event of Jesus.
Faith is not totally dependent on liistorieal
familiarity with Jesus' person, for that es-
chatological act of God is proclaimed in the
kerygma. Indeed, it is as a result of faith in
the kerygma—which itself points to Jesus
as the locus of God's action—that the fides
quaerens intellectum as theological reflection
enters upon the new quest Hence, the new
quest need not and should not be "a com-
plete capitulation to the heirs of Schweitzer" ;
and, in fact, I conclude my review-article of
The Prophet from Nazareth with the state-
ment, "The critical reader of this book is
compelled to become a Bultmannian."18
This Problematik of the new quest's situ-
ation within the context of the old is present
within systematic theology as well as in the
New Testament aspect of the debate. Thus,
John Macquarrie welcomes the new quest as
support for his insistence that the historian
should provide the kerygma with an "em-
pirical anchor," a "minimal core of factual-
ity." What Macquarrie has in mind is sug-
gested by his criticism that a demythologizing
interpretation of the stilling of the storm
denies "any objective reference in the story,"
i.e., denies "that Christ had in fact stilled a
storm on the lake." Over against this, Mac-
quarrie affirms, "the minimal assertion is
that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt
among us.' " w But anyone who expects such
a statement as this last from a historian sim-
ply does not understand the limits set on the
historian's trade. And, indeed, Macquarrie's
contention is more reminiscent of the posi-
tivistic program of Ethelbert Stauffer,
roundly rejected by all involved in the new
quest, than of the new quest itself. To be
sure, Macquarrie states his "minimal core"
in language much like that of the new quest:
"Simply that there was someone who once
exhibited in history the possibility of exist-
ence which the kerygma proclaims."15 He
apparently means by this that the reality
proclaimed by the kerygma is to be proven
historically to have taken place in the case of
Jesus. But again, this reality is God's eschat-
ological, saving action, and, as such, it sim-
ply cannot be proven historically. This act of
God is faith's "fact" and that is why no
"minimal core" of this kind of "factuality"
can ever be provided by the historian. To be
sure, Bultmann rightly identifies the gospel
as consisting for Paul in the having-hap-
penedness of the eschatological event once
and for all, and it is that message which is
directed to me as the proclamation that it is
happening in my life. But this does not
mean that the gospel is to be proved in the
one case and believed in the other, but
rather that I believe it to have happened
once and for all when I believe that it hap-
pens now to me. This is the way the Chris-
tian understands his existence. But to prove
that this understanding of existence emerges
from the historical Jesus is not to prove that
such an understanding is true, i.e., it does
not prove that God has acted or does act.
Nor can the desire for a "minimal core" of
proven security be the motive for inquiring
after Jesus' understanding of existence. The
real motive lies within the context of fides
quaerens intellectum, of theology reflecting
upon its faith; it does not lie outside faith
in a realm that supposedly furnishes a
proven access into faith. Hence, Carl Mi-
chalson is correct in his criticism of Mac-
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quarrie: "This positivistic drive leads Mac-
quarrie to misinterpret the purpose of the
current revival of the 'question of the his-
torical Jesus."1*
II
The most significant thing that has taken
place in the discussion within German cir-
cles since 1959 is not the endless flood of
publications. (These are often more impres-
sive in quantity than quality; the 710-page
symposium, Der historische Jesus und der
kerygmatische Christus, published in East
Berlin, is a most glaring instance.17) Of
primary significance instead is the emer-
gence of an opposition in Germany, parallel-
ing that in the United States and emerging
for much the same reason. For previously
the surprise caused by a Bultmannian pro-
posing a new quest was only equalled by the
way in which the new quest at first swept
everything before it. The "hefty debate"
originally predicted by Kasemann has only
now begun to emerge—although not quite
as he expected. For he probably did not an-
ticipate that he would himself be pushed
more and more toward the opposition by the
way in which his main competitor for the
mantle of leadership in Bultmannian circles,
Ernst Fuchs, would be combining the new
quest with a revival of nineteenth-century
theology.18 Kasemann himself has most re-
cently identified the fanatical apocalypticism
emerging from the Easter experience—not
from any imminent expectation in Jesus'
eschatology—as the "matrix of Christian
theology."19 Hence, Heilsgeschichte, rather
than the new quest, seems a better way to
express the primitive Christian concern for
history.
In a somewhat parallel way Hans Conzel-
mann, as long as he was at Zurich with Ger-
hard Ebeling, was willing to share in the
new quest, merely warning against potential
dangers in the position of Fuchs and Eb-
eling. But when he went to Gottingen,
where an unbroken continuity with the orig-
inal quest is—in the person of Joachim Jere-
mias—most ably represented in Germany,
Conzelmann withdrew from the new quest
by arguing that although one was free to
inquire as to the historical Jesus the matter
was irrelevant to Christian faith.20
The emergence of critical reservations
concerning the new quest is not confined
to such more-sensed-than-fully-documented
feathers in the wind. For Bultmann's reply
to his own students, first expressed in per-
sonal correspondence, was made public in
an address before the Heidelberg Academy
of Sciences on July 25, 1959 and was pub-
lished in December, I960.21
Bultmann begins his reply by distinguish-
ing the question of the historical continuity
between Jesus and the kerygma from the
question of their material relation to each
other. With respect to the question of his-
torical continuity, first, he points out that
his position does not deny a historical con-
tinuity. Such continuity is affirmed in his
very insistence upon the "dass" rather than
the "was," his insistence that the kerygma,
while not interested in historical information
about Jesus, was centrally concerned to af-
firm that the heavenly Lord was one with
Jesus of Nazareth. Were there no Jesus
there would have been no kerygma.22 Sec-
ondly, Bultmann investigates current at-
tempts to demonstrate a material relation
that goes beyond this "dass." Some have
sought to do this by arguing that the ke-
rygma includes a picture of the historical
Jesus and his work. But Bultmann points
out that kerygmatic traditions prior to the
gospels do not contain such a picture.
Hence, the debate boils down to whether the
gospels, as one form of the kerygma, can be
regarded as a kerygmatic tradition which
included a picture of the historical Jesus.
Bultmann first argues the point, which by
now is hardly contested, that the gospels do
not have the kind and amount of historical
information needed for a biography. To be
sure, some historical information can be
inferred from the Synoptics, information
which Bultmann summarizes. He senses,
however, that the great difficulty in working
out a picture of the historical Jesus is that
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one cannot know how Jesus faced his death.
The predictions of the passion are vaticinia
ex eventu, and the psychological argument
by Fuchs emphasizing the impact of John
the Baptist's death is not convincing, since
Jesus did not understand himself as being
at one with John. Furthermore, while we do
not really know much about Jesus' last
twenty-four hours, we must reckon with the
possibility that he was convinced that he
was to be killed for the wrong reason, and
hence that he looked ahead to his coming
death as a meaningless failure.
Now, worthwhile though such information
about Jesus' death might be to someone
writing a biography or a personality sketch,
Jesus' relation to his death is theologically
relevant at only one point: When the ke-
rygma speaks of Jesus giving up his life and
accepting his death, is this talk about Jesus
of Nazareth or, despite the use of his name,
talk not about him but about, e.g., a non-
historical death-resurrection myth? If the
former, it is not a matter of how he did or did
not interpret what was going on in his final
twenty-four hours; it is not a matter of his
psychological processes, his stream of con-
sciousness, at any given time. It is a matter
of the emergence from Jesus of Nazareth
of an understanding of existence consisting
in the renunciation of the present evil eon in
order to live instead out of the inbreaking
kingdom of God as expressed, e.g., in the
saying that he who loses his life saves it,
and he who saves his life loses it. Bultmann
refers to my "avoiding" the problem of our
ignorance of how Jesus felt on Good Friday
through taking recourse in the acceptance
of death as pervasively emerging as Jesus'
understanding of existence.28 As a matter of
fact my point is one Bultmann himself once
made, in asserting that Paul's understanding
of existence is implicit in Jesus' thought.24
I am merely arguing that it is the implicit-
ness of the kerygma in Jesus' understanding
of existence that is required by the ke-
rygma's reference to Jesus, if that reference
is in fact a fitting one. Since this problem
can be met without recourse to the insoluble
question of how Jesus felt in his final twenty-
four hours, it is methodologically sound to
avoid the cul de sac. •
Bultmann's basic objection to the appeal
to the Synoptics is that it involves a "per-
version" of the actual situation with regard
to those sources. "The combination of his-
torical report and kerygmatic christology in
the synoptics is not intended to legitimize
the kerygma of Christ by means of history,
but the other way around, to legitimize so-
to-speak the history of Jesus as messianic,
by putting it in the light of the kerygmatic
christology."26 Bultmann appeals in this
connection to Hans Conzelmann's presenta-
tion of the messianic secret.26 Now the view
of the messianic secret originally held by
Wrede and Bultmann does support Bult-
mann's present position: Unmessianic sto-
ries became acceptable only with the help
of the excuse that Jesus kept his messiah-
ship secret; i.e., the historical Jesus was ac-
ceptable only when he no longer posed a
threat to Christology, but had been brought
indirectly into conformity with Christology.
But Bultmann has not revised his use of the
messianic secret in the light of the fact that
Conzelmann's view of the messianic secret is
explicitly a reversal of the traditional inter-
pretation of Wrede and Bultmann. Prior to
Mark, the oral tradition had already become
messianic or Christological. Mark's work
consists in superimposing upon this Chris-
tological tradition his own paradoxical un-
derstanding of the kerygma, explicated in
terms of the secretness of the messiahship.
Thus, two kerygmatizing phases are in-
volved. The congregation made use of the
Jesus-tradition to present its Christology.
But this Christology seemed inadequately
kerygmatic to Mark. So, rather than return-
ing to the Pauline alternative of proclaiming
only the cross, Mark accepted the principle
that the Jesus-tradition must itself present
the true kerygma. Accordingly, he corrected
the Jesus-tradition to bring it into line with
the true kerygma, thereby producing the
Gattung "gospel." If thus the Jesus-tradition
was corrected by the kerygma, that tradition
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was already of such theological relevance
that the question of whether it conformed
to the kerygma was crucial not only for it
but also for the kerygma.28*
This emergence of the Jesus-tradition
into the light of history in Mark had a back-
ground in primitive Christian debate, to
which recent research has drawn our atten-
tion. Since Bultmann has taught us that be-
lieving the kerygma involves committing
ourselves to a specific understanding of ex-
istence, we are now in a position to correlate
debates about Christian existence with Chris-
tological developments, and out of this com-
bination to reconstruct meaningful segments
of primitive Christian history previously
only vaguely sensed. There emerged in
Paul's Corinthian congregation, as can be
inferred from First Corinthians, a proto-
gnostic perception of existence, according to
which the baptized are already in glory and
thus are beyond historical existence with all
its temptations and suffering.27 According
to this view, one is united with the resur-
rected Lord, not with the earthly Jesus;
indeed, Jesus can even be anathematized (I
Cor. 12:3).28 Paul's letter insists upon the
cross-"side" of the kerygma as the position
where the Christian in this life is to be
located, i.e. he insists that the kerygma
proclaims the understanding of existence in-
volved in taking up one's cross. Our resur-
rection must wait its turn, which is not
yet but at the end. The power of the resur-
rection is in this life paradoxical, i.e., it is
revealed by our suffering, since that power
is the power to persist and endure in temp-
tation and suffering. So Paul argues in
terms of the cross, rather than in terms of
the historical Jesus, although he does repu-
diate the anathematizing of Jesus.
If First Corinthians succeeded in its ob-
jective, Paul's procedure in this case is an
instance of Bultmann's oft-repeated appeal
to Paul (and John) as evidence that faith
does not need the historical Jesus. But the
plot thickens when one observes a new
heresy being brought into Corinth by wan-
dering evangelists, against whose position
Second Corinthians is directed.29 This new
heresy, rather than anathematizing Jesus,
preaches "another Jesus" (II Cor. 11:4),
and on the basis of this position the evange-
lists claim to be in a particular way "Christ's"
(II Cor. 10:7). If one may infer from their
view of a superior apostle their view of
Jesus' superiority, the latter view seems to
have consisted in regarding Jesus as an im-
pressive, power-wielding, miracle-working
0iio>s avqp. In this new heresy much the same
understanding of existence is advanced as
had previously been advocated in Corinth
by appeal to union with the heavenly Lord,
except that now the appeal is made to a
Jesus-tradition. The way that this invasion
by a Jesus-tradition into the Pauline congre-
gation threatens to sweep everything before
it is reflected by the violence of Paul's "tear-
ful letter" (II Cor. 10-13) and by the ex-
treme anxiety he expresses over how the
mission of Titus to Corinth with that letter
will turn out (II Cor. 2:12-13; 7:6ff.). It
is in this situation that Paul makes his dra-
matic statement against knowing Christ ac-
cording to the flesh (II Cor. 5 :16), a state-
ment to which Bultmann so often appeals.
In sharp contrast to such a fleshly under-
standing of Jesus and its resultant under-
standing of existence as a whole, Paul pre-
sents in Second Corinthians as in First
Corinthians the understanding of existence
which he identifies in the kerygma.
If by a supreme effort, yet merely by use
of the kerygma and without recourse to a
Jesus-tradition, Paul thus succeeded in re-
asserting his authority in Corinth against
the "superlative apostles," this solution was
to prove increasingly difficult to maintain,
as the Jesus-tradition continued to circulate.
Hence, by the time of Mark, what had been
possible for Paul was no longer possible,
and Mark had to meet the 0«os <injp Jesus-
tradition on its own ground. His solution
was the messianic secret (as interpreted for
us today by Conzelmann). Mark's problem,
resulting in his messianic secret, was not to
impose messiahship upon a non-messianic
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tradition, but to superimpose upon a
avrip Jesus-tradition the paradox of Chris-
tian existence, the theology of the cross.80
It follows that Bultmann's incessant ap-
peal to Paul and John for justification that
the historical Jesus is not necessary is valid
only in a certain situation and not in an-
other. For it was impossible to worship a
heavenly Lord in terms of one understand-
ing of existence and then to identify that
Lord with a Jesus-tradition expressing a re-
verse understanding of Jesus' existence.
Once such a Jesus-tradition had gained com-
mon acceptance, it was in terms of that con-
crete situation that the gospel had to be pro-
claimed. (In every day and age, the gospel
must be addressed to concrete situations.)
Hence, the question concerning the necessity
of a new quest can be relevantly answered
not in the abstract, as Bultmann does, but
only in the concrete, in the situation in
which we find ourselves. And the truth is
that our situation is one where hero worship
is much more widespread than the accept-
ance of the kerygma as a norm of existence,
where the endless spawning of lives of Jesus
is one of the facts of life, and where a church
that cannot claim Jesus for its message is in
a very awkward position. Although we will
not, I hope, turn our backs on the kerygma
in another back-to-Jesus movement, but will
instead proclaim the kerygma in our situa-
tion, we must nevertheless implement the
kerygma's claim to be proclaiming a Lord
who is one with Jesus, and we must do this
by critical participation in the discussion of
the Jesus-tradition of our day. To this ex-
tent, our situation reproduces that of the
Synoptics rather than that of Paul.81 When
Bultmann then asks me whether the evange-
lists' interest in emphasizing the significance
of history for faith goes beyond merely af-
firming the "doss," the fact that the Lord
was a historical person,82 I must reply: In
the situation in which the synoptic authors
found themselves, one could no longer main-
tain, as Paul could, the "doss", the histori-
calness of the worshipped Lord, merely by
repeated assertion of the fact of his histori-
calness. In their situation—and ours—an
emphasis upon the "doss," indispensible as
it is for the kerygma and for Bultmann,
could only be made in terms of the Jesus-
tradition and not by ignoring that tradition
through an exclusive proclamation of the
Easter gospel. In their situation, the synop-
tic writers could retain the "doss" only by
maintaining a position on the "was," i.e.,
only by making corrective use of the Jesus-
tradition, by replacing the un-Christian un-
derstanding of existence which had invaded
the Jesus-tradition, with a Christian under-
standing of existence. This is the Sits im
Leben, the Tendenz, which accounts for and
justifies the practice of the Synoptics, so
different from early kerygmatic texts and
from Paul, and which also authenticates the
Gospels as canonical and, with them, the
validity and necessity of the new quest in
our situation.
I l l
Bultmann then turns to investigate the
other way of handling the material relation
between Jesus and the kerygma. If the first
approach, typified by Althaus, has looked
within the kerygma for details of the histori-
cal Jesus, the second approach, typified by
the new quest, seeks an implicit kerygma
in Jesus' deeds and words. This latter can
be done either in terms of the traditional
historical-critical method, which views the
past objectively, or by supplementing that
method through understanding history in
terms of an existential relation to history
("existentialist interpretation"). From the
standpoint of the historical-critical method
alone, one can say that Jesus understood
himself as an eschatological phenomenon,
and that his call for a decision concerning
his message implied a Christology, which
was explicated in the Christology of the
primitive church.83 Thus, the historical con-
tinuity from Jesus the proclaimer to Jesus
Christ the proclaimed is made intelligible.
But this demonstration of continuity does
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not answer the question of a material unity
of Jesus' words and deeds with the ke-
rygma. Nor can this explanation of historical
phenomena of the past "mediate" an es-
chatological self-understanding to us today,
in the way that the kerygma does.
It is the second alternative of "existential-
ist interpretation" which Bultmann's stu-
dents have primarily followed and which
seems more congenial to Bultmann himself.
Accordingly, he commends my "methodo-
logical reflections" and the execution of this
program by Herbert Braun.8* But he ar-
gues that Ernst Fuchs has not carried
through existentialist interpretation consist-
ently and has, indeed, given up that method.86
For the focus of Fuchs upon Jesus' con-
duct slides into a historical-psychological
interpretation, through considering that con-
duct perceptible to an objectifying view.
Jesus' self-understanding and his decision
are treated by Fuchs as phenomena observ-
able to the objectifying historian, i.e., Jesus'
self-understanding is assumed to be self-
conscious. Furthermore, the arguments by
Fuchs that Jesus' parables defend his con-
duct and that he himself had made the same
decision as he summoned others to make are
regarded as psychological observations ir-
relevant to the understanding of existence
implicit in Jesus' message. Rather than af-
firming that existentialist interpretation
leads to our being called upon to believe,
Fuchs reflects upon Jesus' faith and his
prayer life. The guiding question of a ma-
terial continuity between Jesus and the ke-
rygma should rather have raised the question
of whether those who hearkened to Jesus
before Easter had the equivalent to faith in
the kerygma.
There is an odd parallel between this
criticism of Fuchs and the common criticism
of Bultmann. According to this criticism,
Bultmann's insistence upon the necessity of
the unique event of the past is held to be
inconsistent with, or at least unnecessary to,
the self-understanding involved in the ke-
rygma. For, according to Bultmann, the self-
understanding involved in the kerygma con-
sists materially in understanding oneself as
dependent for one's Christian existence on
that once-for-all saving event. It seems in-
consistent, therefore, that in investigating
the self-understanding involved in Jesus'
message, Bultmann should ignore this pos-
sibility and sense only the psychologizing
overtones in the treatment by Fuchs. Fuchs
has most recently shifted his terminology
from Jesus' self-understanding to his time-
understanding, which may clarify the dis-
tinction between psychological observations
falling outside an existentialist interpreta-
tion and structures relevant to an existen-
tialist interpretation.86
Bultmann criticizes similarly Ebeling,86*
Bornkamm, and Kasemann for not distin-
guishing clearly between an existentialist
interpretation and an objectifying view.37
On the other hand, he identifies Herbert
Braun as the most consistent user of the
existentialist method.88 Braun does not ask
about historical continuity but about the ma-
terial consistency between the self-under-
standing in the proclamation of Jesus and
the self-understanding in the proclamation
of the church. By going behind the termi-
nology to the latent intention, Braun suc-
ceeds in showing the material unity of the ke-
rygma about Christ with the preaching of
Jesus. Bultmann concedes that I, by "rais-
ing programmatically the requirement of ex-
istentialistic interpretation," attain the same
goal. He accepts my formulations of this
understanding of existence, but then ques-
tions whether, in my analysis of the formal
structure of Jesus' sayings, I have succeeded
in identifying in Jesus the existentialist di-
alectic of believing existence which he (Bult-
mann) finds first emerging explicitly in Paul
and John.89
I am indebted to Schubert M. Ogden at
this point for having called Bultmann's at-
tention to statements of his own which are
in substance the same as mine. Bultmann
has replied to this that in his statements
equivalent to mine, he had in mind the ex-
istentialist meaning of Jesus' message, while
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in his statements denying the dialectic in
Jesus, he had in mind Jesus' self-conscious-
ness. Bultmann concedes that Jesus was
conscious of a chronological "betweenness"
with respect to the old and the new eons.
But Jesus was not conscious of the fact that
his message of this chronological interim
served to place his hearers in a paradoxical,
material "betweenness," with which my ex-
istentialist interpretation has to do, and
which was to become conscious in Paul and
John. Thus, a distinction is again made be-
tween "implicit" and "explicit," between
"self-understanding" and "self-conscious-
ness." Since my case does not depend on
whether Jesus' self-understanding emerged
into his self-consciousness, the material dis-
tinction between my position and Bult-
mann's tends to disappear. R. H. Fuller's
argument that there is a "greater degree"
of fulfillment in the kerygma than in Jesus,
a view which Bultmann follows in criticiz-
ing the new quest,40 thus becomes a distinc-
tion only on the conscious level of formula-
tion, not at the existential level of meaning.
Indeed, Bultmann adds that there is a
material difference between Jesus and the
kerygma, in that the kerygma not only pre-
sents the paradox of future and present as
a possibility for understanding one's ex-
istence, but also calls for faith in Jesus
Christ. Here precisely is the point at issue
between Bultmann and myself in our under-
standings of Jesus: I have argued that im-
plicit in Jesus' message there is a structure
corresponding to the kerygma's reference
to the once-for-all event of cross and resur-
rection. I do not have in mind predictions
of the passion or messianic claims, against
which Bultmann rightly but one-sidedly pro-
tests, but rather the presupposition, upon
which Jesus' ministry was built, of divine
intervention in the last hour. Thus, the de-
bate over whether we should study Jesus
historically depends to some extent upon
the outcome of such study—a fact which
need embarrass not those who maintain the
theological relevance of such study, but only
those who deny it.
Yet the question of the material relation-
ship between Jesus and the kerygma does
not rest simply upon whether there is a
consistency in the respective understandings
of existence. For the "matter" involved in
these understandings of existence is not sim-
ply or even primarily a human stance, but
rather an understanding of God's action as
the context of one's existence. It is this ac-
tion of God as the "matter" or "content" of
Jesus' understanding of existence that can-
not be carried over into the present by his-
torical research. Bultmann asks critically:
Does Jesus' eschatological consciousness mediate
an eschatological self-understanding to him who
perceives it as a historical phenomenon? But that
is precisely what the kerygma intends, which as
kerygma claims to be an eschatological occurrence
(2 Cor. 5:18-20; Jn. 5:24; etc.), which as direct
address grants death and life (2 Cor. 2:15f.).
Does Jesus' claim of authority, perceived as a
historical phenomenon, reach beyond the tune of
his earthly activity? Does the exhortation and re-
assurance of the historical Jesus, in its "unmedi-
atedness", reach later generations? But it is pre-
cisely that which happens in the kerygma, in which
it is not the historical Jesus but the Exalted who
says: "All power has been given me." The Christ
of the kerygma has so-to-speak pushed the histor-
ical Jesus to one side and now addresses with au-
thority the hearer—every hearer. How then can
one speak of a likeness of Jesus' activity with the
kerygma in the sense that in Jesus' deed and word
the kerygma is already contained in nucef*
This argument seems to me to rest upon a
failure on Bultmann's part to make a dis-
tinction between two meanings of the word
kerygma. For "kerygma" is used to mean
both the content of primitive Christian
preaching and the act of preaching then and
now. One can perhaps say that the English
term, as popularized by C. H. Dodd, is most
commonly used to refer to the content of
primitive Christian preaching, whereas
Bultmann normally has in mind the author-
itative act of preaching. I would agree with
Bultmann that the encounter with God does
not take place in the modern historian's ex-
istentialist interpretation, but rather in the
confrontation with the proclamation of the
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church. But the use of the same word, ke-
rygma, both for the church's act of preaching
and for the content of the Easter message of
cross and resurrection obscures the fact that
the problem of Jesus' message as against
that of the modern preacher is no different
from the problem of primitive Christianity's
message as against that of the modern
preacher. A historian's reconstruction, for
example, of the pre-Pauline Hellenistic or
Palestinian kerygma is just as non-keryg-
matic as is the historian's reconstruction
of Jesus. Yet since the rise of historical-
critical method, the historical kerygma has
been a legitimate and necessary subject of
inquiry—not to replace the minister's
preaching, but to improve it. The denial of
the relevance of the historical study of
Jesus can be separated only in, an arbitrary
way from a denial of the relevance of his-
torical-critical and existentialist exegesis of
the New Testament text. Just as one can
say that historical-critical and existentialist
interpretation of the New Testament is not
of the esse of preaching, but belongs to the
bene esse of preaching, so one can say that
in our situation the historical study of Jesus
is not of the esse of preaching, but belongs
to its bene esse. Thus, the basic refutation of
Bultmann's position on the relevance of the
historical Jesus is that if carried to its ulti-
mate consequence it would prove too much.
It would bring to an end the scholarly study
of the Bible and theological scholarship in
general as having any function for the church.
At stake ultimately is the relevance of bib-
lical and theological scholarship for the
church, a point which is by no means always
conceded by the church but upon which we
at least should be of one mind.
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